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Neoclassical political economy provides com-  therefore unable to explain policy changes or
pelling theory in response to the question, "Why  wise policy choices.
should reasonable men adopt public policies that
harm the societies they govem?"  Microecon-  Grindle argues that these are critical weak-
omic assumptions about individual self-interest  nesses of neoclassical political economy, and
are applied to the political claims of citizens, to  they present policy analysts with a challenge:
the actions of politicians and policymakers, to  can alternative models of politics be conceptual-
the behavior of bureaucrats, and even to the  ized that address issues of change, predict the
actions of states more genmrally. Citizens,  content of change, and maintain a role for those
politicians, bureaucrats, and states purposely use  who seek both politically and economically
the authority of the state to aistort economic  viable solutions to the major problems facing
interactions to their own benefit.  In doing so,  developing countries in the decades ahead?
they are behaving in a way that is politically
rational, however irrational the economic results  She recommends an altemative approach to
may be for society.  The solution is to lirpit  political economy that does not treat politius as a
government; less politics makes better econom-  negative factor in policy choic  She empha-
ics, or so the argument goes.  sizes understanding the preferences and percep-
tions of policy elites, the circumstances that
Grindle argues that this perspective on  surround the emergence of policy issues, the
politics misrepresents the dynamics of poli-  concems of decision makers, and the factors that
cymaking in developing countries and is seri-  affect the implementation and sustainability of
ously limited in its ability to explain how policy  policy change.  In such an altemative, politics
changes come about or how policies are chosen  consists of efforts at problem solving through
that lead to socially beneficial outcomes.  bargaining and the use of political resources in
the context of great uncertainty.
She indicates that society-centric models of
political economy adopted from the U.S. experi-  Economic and political logic are i-ot always
ence are not relevant for most developing  at loggerheads and there often exists a space in
countries.  State-centric adaptations come  which citizens, public officials, and analysts can
somewhat closer to the reality of how public  maneuver to achieve policy choices that are both
policy is formulated and implemented there.  politically and economically wise.  It is worth-
But even state-centric applications do not  while to attempt to model this space and to use
address the dynamics of policymaking and im-  such models to help craft policy advice.
plementation in developing countries and are
This paper is a product of the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division,
Country Economics Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Raquel Luz, room
NI1-057,  extension 61588 (67 pages).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research  I
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
i The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CcnterThe  New Political  Economy:
Positive  Economics  and  Negative  Politics*
by
Merilee  S.  Grindle
Table  of Contents
The  New Political  Economy:  The  Logic of Argument  10
How Applicable  is  the  New Political  Economy  to  21
Conditions  in  Developing  Countries?
Lobbying  by  Interest  Groups  23
The  Actions  of  Policymakers  27
The  Activities  of Bureaucrats  30
Getting  from  Here  to  There  34
Bases  for an Alternative  Political  Economy  45
Notes  56
Bibliography  60
*Prepared  for  presentation  at  a  conference  on  The  New Political
Economy  and  Development  Policymaking,  Lake Paipa,  Colombia,  July
12-15,  1989.3
The New Political Economy:
Positive Economics and Negative Politics 1
As they approach the 1990s,  many development economists
are deeply concerned about the future of developing countries.
In Latin America, they are perplexed about altering development
strategies that generate systemic inflation and recurring balance
of payments crises.  Crippling foreign debt, linked to increased
energy prices and recession in the international economy, can
also be traced to the policies of governments that dreamed too
grandly, grew too large, spent too much, and taxed hardly at all
(Sachs  1985; Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski, and Simonsen 1986;
Kuczynski 1988; Fishlow 1985).  In much of Africa, only the most
bright-spirited would not find cause for disillusion.  Corrupt
and personalistic governments have almost ceased to exert
authority in many societies and populations have retreated into
family, ethnic, or village security systems and the plethora of
parallel markets substituting for the formal legal and economic
systems that no longer function (Sandbrook 1986; Hyden 1983;
World Bank 1984; Jones and Roemer 1989).  In such conditions,4
poverty, strife, inefficiency, and administrative collapse
confound plans for short or medium term recovery.  Despite a
itumber  of success stories, some Asian countries have also been
characterized by stymied growth, inefficient agricultural and
industrial sectors, and policy making systems that serve only a
narrow range of interests (Haggard  1989; Bardhan 1984; Johnson
1983; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987).
The 1980s were a decade in which these conditions cut
deeply into the consciousness of development economists.  Not
surprisingly, the issue of policy reform came to dominate
discussions among specialists.  Increasingly, governments were
urged to establish a macroeconomic policy context more conducive
to growth, to adjust sectoral policies to increase efficiency and
responsiveness to the market, and to lessen the regulatory and
interventionist presence of the state in economic interactions
(see,  for reviews, Roemer 1988- Perkins 1988).  Neoclassical
economists stressed structural adjustment, liberalization,
privatization, and decentralization as important elements of a
successful development strategy.  Nevertheless, this concern
about the centrality of policy reform to development fueled
increasing disillusion when many governments proved reluctant to
introduce reoriented policies, even when under considerable
pressure from international financial institutions.  Despice the
impetus of the worst economic crisis in the modern era, po'icies
damned as inimical to growth often proved difficult to alter.
Authoritarian and democratic governments alike frequently5
appeared unable to overcome the stalemate of existing policy to
adopt strategies that policy advisors recommended as being more
efficient and more effective in generating growth.  Many
economists echoed  the concerns expressed by Gerald Meier:
Governments  continue to undertake policies
contrary to the normative principles of
development economics and in contradiction to the
policy lessons from development experience.
Inward looking policies, inflationary  budgets,
policies of deliberate industrialization,  urban
bias, and factor market distortions continue
despite the policy recommendations of development
economists (1989:1).
After at least three decades of research, analysis, and advice-
giving, it is understandable that some development economists
would be tempted by pessimism.
The sense of disillusion is perhaps all the greater
because neoclassical  economics had traditionally held high
expectations  about the motives behind state policy. 2 Policy
analysis, focused  on achieving optimal solutions to given
problems, had assumed a benign and welfare-maximizing state, a
state that was disembodied from the identity of its leadership,
the diverse claims of its citizens, or the orientations of its
historical evolution.  In particular, planning models of the
1960s assumed that policy makers, planners, and the institutions
of the state held notions of the public interest that6
corresponded to economic notions of welfare maximizntion.3  In
short, behind policy analysis, advice, and planning was an
implicit notion of states whose purpose was to do good (see
Colander 1984a; Bardhan 1987).  Presented  with technical evidence
of how to achieve increased welfare, states would adopt
apprcpriate policy.  In such a perspective, failure to achieve
goals was the result of incomplete information, faulty analysis,
or institutional weaknesses in carrying out policy  (see
especially Killick 1976:164-165).
The harsh realities of the 1980s made it increasingly
difficult to sustain assumptions about welfare maximizing states.
In fact, research, experience, and frustration  combined to
encourage considerable interest in the study of political economy
among development economists.  Among diverse political economy
models that are bewing explored in this context, recent
neoclassical models have helped resolve the clash between theory
and empirical observation by replacing the image of the benign
state with its mirror opposite, the negative state.  Whereas the
benign state was assumed to be motivated to do good, the negative
state of neoclassical aproaches was characterized as a creature
of self-seeking interest groups and/or self-serving leaders and
could be expected to do harm to societal  welfare unless it was
carefully restricted in its activities.  Work in the 1970s and
1980s utilized concepts such as the rent-seeking society and the
predatory state to account for why states adopted and then
persisted in pursuing policies that introduced and increased7
distortions in the economy, creating and exacerbating
inefficiency, stagnation,  and inequality (see especially Lal
1984; Conybeare 1982; Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1982; Srinivasan
1985).  Politicians  and bt eaucrats ceased to be seen as value
neutral public servants and became, in narrativa and in model
construction, narrowly  motivated to stay in power or to maximize
their individual gains through rent-seeking and the encouragement
of directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP).  Moreover, while
the benign state was always empirically elusive, the image of the
negative state has strong empirical referents for many economists
who have worked in developing countries.  Intuitively and
conceptually, then, neoclassical political economy provided
answers to a number of questions about the role of the state and
public policy in economic development.4
This new political economy, a theoretical orientation
developed primarily by economists and encompassing the
perspectives of public choice, collective choice, and social
choice theory, has proved extraordinarily useful as a construct
for explaining economically irrational policy to neoclassical
economists and political scientists alike.  It offers
parsimonious formal  theory to respond to Robert Bates'
challenging question, "Why should reasonable men adopt public
policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they
govern?" (Bates  1981:3).  Although there are distinct strains of
thought within this neoclassical approach, they are based in a
set of basic assumptions about human behavior.  In neoclassical8
political economy, as developed primarily by economists,
traditional microeconomic assumptions about the primacy of
individual self-interest are applied with equal consistency to
the political claims of citizens, to the actions of politicians
and policy makers, to the behavior of bureaucrats, and even to
the actions of states more generally (see  Conybeare 1982;
Hirshleifer 1985).  Through the lens of self-interest, politics
becomes endogenous to policy choice and can be modelled along
with more traditional economic variables.  Moreover, neoclassical
political economy offers an explanatory framework to help
development specialists understand why governments of developing
countries do not adopt their advice with greater regularity.
The new political economy also offers a profoundly
cynical view of the political process.  Clearly, there is much
empirical evidence to support a deeply skeptical attitude about
the existence of a benign state.  However, the neoclassical
approach adopts the notion that individually ration behavior in
politics leads to economically irrational outcomes.  That is,
individual self-interest pursued in a political arena results in
policies that are collectively wasteful and, ultimately,
individually irrational also.  Moreover, neoclassical political
economy suggests that politically rational behavior is capable of
fairly consistently overwhelming  the demonstrable logic of good
economic policy advice.  It thus makes the task of explaining the
potential for policy reform and change extremely difficult and
limits the applicability of its policy relevant advice.  Carried9
to its logical conclusions, it may well be a  trap for those
concerned to bring about change in existing policies and
institutional arrangements.  The new political economy has many
strengths, but is weakened as an approach to understanding policy
making in developing countries and no a policy analytic tool by
the assumption that politics is a negative factor in attempting
to get the policies right.  This chapter presents a critique of
an explanation of policy making that predicts negative outcomes
for society and that emphasizes the inability to introduce
significant change in development policy.
In the following pages, I assess the relevance of
neoclassical political economy for explaining policy making in
developing countries and consider its utility in policy analysis.
Thus, I am less concerned here with a critique of the basic
assumptions of the models that have been developed than with the
utility of the models in capturing  the nature and process of
policy dynamics.  Granting the assumptions, I ask how accurate
and useful the tools of neoclassical political economy are in the
analysis of public policy in developing countries.  This is,
then, not primarily a critique of formal theory, but of the
utility of formal theory.
Briefly, I argue that society-centric political economy
models adopted from the U.S. experience are not particularly
relevant for most developing countries.  State-centric
adaptations come somewhat closer to the reality of how public
policy is formulated and implemented in these contexts.  Even10
with more appropriate applications,  however, the new political
economy is most useful for explaining stasis rather than change
and "bad" policy choices rather than "good"  ones. 5 That is, I
argue that the perspective is reductionist in a way that impedes
efforts to conceptualize or explain what is most sought after by
many of its adherents--change  and improvement in the nature of
development policy in a society.  A model of policymaking
relevant for this era of economic crisis and political up)  'al
would be one in which politics is assumed to be neither
inherently negative nor inherently positive for the selection and
pursuit of pub  c  policy.  It would accept politics, not as a
spanner in the economic works, but as the central means through
which societies seek to resolve confl:ict  over issues of
distribution and values.  In such a perspective, politically
rational behavior would not be viewed as a constraint on the
achievement of collectively beneficial public policy.
The New Political Economy: The Logic of Argument
Neoclassical political economy asserts that the basic
unit of social analysis is the individual (see for example,
Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Colander 1984b;  Riker and Ordeshook
1973; Barry and Hardin 1982).  _Individuals  are rational and as
such, they seek to maximnize  individual utilities or values,
characterized as the pursuit of self-interest.  Self-interest is
theoretically contentless until individual preferences are11
revealed through behavior, although it is generally assumed that
self-seeking individuals  will pursue enhanced economic welfare or
economic security.  Individuals  will seek to maximize their gains
from economic interaction;  simultaneously, they will seek to use
government to increase and protect these gains.  The new
political economy seeks to understand the non-economic market of
political activity, using the language and analytic tools of the
economist (see  Hir'.chleiffer  1985:53).
Central to understanding politics through this
perspective is the assertion that individuals  cannot always
achieve their self-interest individually.  At times, it will be
rational for them to join together with other individuals  whose
self-interest corresponds  with their own, to press for the
achievement of individual goals.  In this way, individuals can
transform their pursuit of self-interest into group action (see
especially Riker and Ordeshook 1973).  The payoff to members of
the group for joint action is the enhanced possibility that
individual goals will be realized.  Rational individuals,
therefore, are encouraged to cooperate with like-minded others if
and when such cooperation clearly results in a more optimal
individual payoff than when acting alone.  When the achievement
of such goals involves  making claims on government, the basis for
political action is laid.  Generally, politics is considered to
be activities in pursuit of self-interest through voting by
individuals and lobbying for favorable policy outcomes by groups
(see Nlt and Chrystal 1983; Buchanan and Tullock 1962).612
Lobbying involves seeking access to benefits that cannot be
acquired through a competitive  market; lobbying activities will
increase the more government intervenes in the economy (see
Buchanan 1980).  Economic benefits sought through non-economic
markets are considered by most neoclassical  political economists
to be wasteful in that they result in a loss of social welfare
(Srinivasan  1985:43; see Bhagwati 1982 for a discussion).  The
use of the state to maximize economic gains for specific
interests has been dubbed "rent-seeking" (see  Samuels and Mercuro
1984:55-56;  Krueger  1974).  7
Mancur Olson, in considering the problem of collective
action, notes the difficulty of sustaining joint activities if
individuals perceive they will achieve the sought after benefits
even without contributing their time, effort, or money to group
action (see  Olson 1965).  This problem of the free rider means
that groups tend to remain small and narrowly focused on
achieving specific goals that will accrue only to group members
if action is successful.  In politics, therefore, narrowly
focused special interest groups will tend to emerge in order to
press government for specific benefits for their members--a
special tax exclusion or allotment of funds for a neighborhood
school, for example.8  For neoclassical  political economists,
then, politics is characterized by a plethora of special interest
groups competing for access to the benefits that can be allocated
by government and individual voting behavior that is motivated by
self-interest, electing those who promise to deliver these13
benefits and punishing those who fail to make such promises or
who fail to make good on them if they are elected (Downs  1957).
According to Olson (1965;  1982), public policy reflects the
existence of distributional coalitions in society that seek to
shape and control the allocation of public resources to the
benefit of their members.
This perspective on politics is similar in many regards
to a long tradition of democratic political theory in the United
States.  In the pluralist model often adopted by political
scientists, society is also composed of self-interested
individuals.  Motivated by the majoritarian requisites of
democratic government, they join together in groups and then
coalitions of like-minded individuals  to press for favorable
government action. 9 Interests are usually economic, but groups
also form around shared concerns for neighborhood, ethnicity,
religion, values, region, or other goals.  They lobby, they
contribute to campaigns, and they vote in order to influence
public officials to act on their behalf.  In the pluralist
tradition, democratic politics is based on large numbers of such
groups competing and coalescing around the promotion or
protection of common policy goals. 10 Political conflict in
democratic society is moderated by the fact that individual group
members have multiple interests and affiliations that tend to be
crosscutting, limiting the intensity of their commitment to any
one goal, and by the need of the group to join in coalitions with
other groups in order to have enough power (i.e. votes) to14
influence government.  Party competition also is moderated by the
need of parties to attract voters, most of whom reside in the
middle of the spectrum of political opinion (see Downs 1957).
In the pluralist tradition, as in much neoclassical
political economy, public policy is the result of the pushing and
hauling among interest groups and their efforts to influence
government through lobbying--this is a society-centric view of
the determinants of policy, as we will see later.  Interest
groups raise issues to public attention and place them on the
agenda for government action and it is their lobbying activities
that determine decisional outcomes.  The actions of public
officials reflect the distribution of power among interests in
society.  Pluralist and neoclassical political economy theories
clearly agree that the key to understanding politics and public
policy is to understand the composition and interaction of
interest groups in the society and the claims they make on
government.  11
Pluralists and neoclassical political economists tend
to part company, however, over the issue of how the public
interest is achieved in policy.  In the pluralist tradition, the
public interest is ultimately served through the conflict and
competition of interest groups.  The tendency for interests to be
fragmented is counteracted by the need in democratic government
to achieve majoritarian consent--in the population at large or
within representative bodies of lawmakers--that requires groups
*to compromise on positions and form coalitions around more15
broadly defined interests.  Minorities are protected because of
the difficulty of putting together majority coalitions and the
need, in doing so, to moderate extreme positions.  Tho.ae  affected
adversely by proposed or actual legislation  have an opportunity
to organize to oppose it.  The impediments to acquiring consent
under democratic rules is--at least theoretically--supposed to
act as a control on the growth of government, ensuring the widest
possible scope for pursuit of self-interest in the economic
marketplace.  This pluralist tradition of the public ir.terest
emerging from competition in the political marketplace is a clear
analogy to the notion of efficiency achieved in the economic
marketplace through the competition among numerous firms.  In
democratic practice, the Founding Fathers institutionalized this
pluralist political economy.  In defending the notion of a
federal republic, for instance, James Madison argued that "...the
society itself will be broken into so many parts and classes of
citizens, that the rights of indivi.duals  or of the minority will
be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority"
(Federalist  Paper No. 51).
In contrast, neoclassical political economy perceives
in the conflict and competition among interest groups a clear
threat to the ability of government to respond to the public
interest with policies that are economically rational for society
in general.  The logic of collective action tends to enforce
smallness in groups and to keep their interests narrowly focused
on specific benefits for group members.  The result of their16
activities to influence government is a parcelling out of policy
to the narrowly defined interests and a growth in the size and
incoherence of government as elected public officials scurry to
respond to a multitude of specific interest groups.  Rent-seeking
by interest groups overwhelms the notion of a public interest.
The renslt  is incoherent and burdensome policy that distorts
economic Interactions and encourages inefficiency  through
excessive regulation put into effect in order to protect or
promote a plethora of interests (Buchanan 1980; Olson 1982).
While an "invisible hand" regulates economic markets, an
"invisible foot" results in their distortion through politics
(see  Magee 1984).
To remedy this situation, the clear need is to limit
closely the activities of government so that it will have less
with which to reward specific interests (Buchanan 1980).  Limited
government is the neoclassical solution to the problem of state
policy (see Colander 1984a:5).  If there is less to acquire
through efforts to influence government, there will be less
political activity focused on extracting benefits from government
and a more unfettered economic system, able to respond with
greater speed to market forces.  According to Bennett and
DiLorenzo (1984:217),  "the problem of reforming the rent-seeking
society is widely perceived to be the adoption of an appropriate
set of rules to limit the burdens of government."  In this
formulation, less politics generally means better economics.  For
neoclassical political economists, interest group competition in17
the absence of specific rules to control its scope breeds big
government and distortion of the normal functioning of the
market.
...so long as governmental action is restricted
largely, if not entirely, to protecting individual
rights, persons and preperty, and enforcing
voluntarily negotiated private contracts, the
market process dominates economic behavior....If,
however, government action moves significantly
beyond the limits defined by the minimal or
protective state...  the tendency toward the erosion
or dissipation of rents is countered and may be
shortly blocked (Buchanan 1980:9).
Thus, in the neoclassical view, politics and markets are often in
conflict in the sense that the efficient operation of competitive
markets is easily threatened by policy interventions resulting
from interest group pressures on government.  Public policy tends
in this way to reflect politically rational choices that lead to
economically irrational outcomes.
When the new political economy has probed inside the
state and inquired into the decision making of political and
bureaucratic elites, 'it  has also presented rational political
choice as an impediment to achieving the collective economic
good.  Although the focus of most work has been society-centric,
in which government action is presumed to reflect vested
interests found in society, some analysts have sought to explain18
the behavior of actors within the state or of the state itself.
In more state-centered explanations of the politics of economic
policy making, politicians are as rational and self-seeking as
are voters.  Their self-interest, however, is expressed as the
desire to maximize their hold on power.  Power is thus the end
sought by politically rational officials.  They will therefore be
motivated to use government resources to reward those who support
their hold on power and, at times, to punish those who seek to
unseat them (see for example Ames 1987; Bates 1981).  In this
way, policy elites become less reactive to interest group
pressures and more active in attempting to maximize their chances
of staying in power by putting together supportive coalitions and
using public resources to "buy" support.  The actions of
political elites are contentless in terms of normative
preferences in policy; they will take any policy position if it
promises to maximize their short term goal of staying in power.
The policy that tends to emerge from this situation is largely
incoherent and even contradictory and inimical to economic
stability and growth because of the short term time horizons of
the politicians and their lack of commitment to the content of
public policy as long as they believe that it will win them
support.  12
Neoclassical political economy, when it takes a more
state-centric approach, also makes a series of statements about
the behavior of non-elected public officials.  Bureaucrats are
also individualistic self-seekers.  Generally, their self-19
interest is to maximize their own economic welfare, but it can
also be that of enhancing their power or benefitting their home
village or ethnic group or some such goal.  When provided with
policy resources to distribute--import licenses, for example, or
the location of school sites--they will seek to maximize their
self-interest either by selling the resource to whoever offers
the highest price or by allocating it to preferred clients.
Thus, corruption and clientelism can be understood to result from
non-economic markets that function through bureaucratic resource
allocations.  Bureaucrats are rent-seekers, just as their clients
are.  The new political economy thus provides a third explanation
for the economically irrational allocation of public resources.
A fourth application of the new political economy is
the idea of the predatory state (see Lal 1984).  In this
perspective, the state becomes the unit of analysis, not the
citizen, the politician, or the bureaucrat.  The state as a
rational actor seeks to maximize short-term revenues and will
seek out a variety of forms of taxation that will allow it to
increase its wealth and to grow in size, even at the cost of
overall economic development.  Predatory states are particularly
likely to tax trade and to maintain  an overvalued exchange rate
and to maintain large inefficient  bureaucracies (see Killick
1988:7; Findlay 1988; Conybeare 1982).  Economically irrational
development strategies are thus introduced and perpetuated by
predatory states acting in rational ways to enhance their power.20
Neoclassical political economy provides a compelling
explanation of economically irrational policy outcomes in
developing countries.  It asserts that individuals, politicians,
bureaucrats, and states purposely use the authority of the state
to distort economic interactions to their own benefit.
Empirically, developing countries provide numerous cases of such
economically irrational outcomes.  For instance, there are many
examples of predominantly agrarian societies whose governments
have followed policies that have systematically over-taxed
agriculture in the interests of urban and industrial development
(Bates  1981; Anderson and Hayami 1986).  It is not difficult to
find cases of countries locked into development strategies that
are generating little growth because of the combined economic and
political power of vested interests; the continued pursuit of
import  substitution is often credited to this situation.  There
are also numerous examples of policies with short term benefits
but long term costs--an overvalued exchange rate or extensive
protectionist measures, for instance.  Similarly, many
governments adopt cumbersome and inefficient policy mechanisms
such as import licensing when more administratively efficient
mechanisms, such as tariffs, are readily available.  Moreover,
governments often invest widely in projects rather than
formulating and implementing more general policies; in
neoclassical analysis, this is because specific interests lobby
for specific benefits, not general ones, or because politicians
are concerned with buying the support of specific groups in their21
single-minded pursuit of power (Olson  1982; Bates 1981).  It is
also often true that development resources get systematically
misallocated during implementation  processes (see  Grindle 1980).
Neoclassical political economy explains these outcomes without
having to assume ignorance, stupidity, or willful misbehavior on
the part of citizens, policy makers, or bureaucrats.
How Applicable is the New Political Economy to Conditions in
Developing Countries?
While a large number of economically irrational
outcomes in public policy can be explained with neoclassical
political economy, it is worth considering whether this approach
correctly captures the dynamics that lead to such outcomes in
developing countries.  That is, current work in political economy
identifies--often correctly--certain policy outcomes, from which
it infers political processes that led to such outcornes. The
question here is whether the inferences are warranted, given what
is known about processes of decision making and policy
implementation in developing countries.  In particular, can the
process of government decision making in developing countries be
explained through recourse to the activities of rent-seeking
lobbies?  Power-seeking politicians?  Rent-seeking bureaucrats?
Predatory states?
The first of these alternatives, that policy choice
corresponds to the actions of pressure groups on government with22
resultant policies reflecting their interests, is a society-
centric explanation of policy making (see Grindle and Thomas
1989).  In this perspective, the activities of states and policy
elites are dependent variables.  When the new political economy
has tried to explain the policy preferences of politicians,
bureaucrats, or states in general, it has adopted a more state-
centric approach in which these actors have greater autonomous
capacity to shape policy outcomes.  In the case of the society-
centric explanation of public policy, emphasis is placed on the
use of political markets by economic agents; in the case of more
state-centric applications, political agents make use of economic
resources for political er.ds.13
In what follows, I suggest that neoclassical political
economy is least applicable to the dynamics of policy making in
developing countries when it takes a society-centered approach,
that is, when it is based on assumptions about interest
mobilization and more or less acquiescent government response to
lobbying activities.  It is more applicable when it replaces this
society-centric view with a more state-centric perspective based
on political elites who are actively engaged in maximizing their
hold on political power or on rent-seeking bureaucratic
officials.  Even here, however, the approach tends to
misrepresent the political meaning of the actions of political
elites and bureaucratic officials.  Finally, while the notion of
predatory states has been adopted for predictive purposes in some
cases, there is little theoretical support in either economics or23
politics  for  treating  states  as unitary  actors  or assuming
purposive  behavior  on the part  of the  state  as a collectivity.
In what  follows,  the notion  of predatory  states  is not  dealt  with
because  of the difficulty  of assuming  that  unitary  states  act  out
of individual  self-interest  in the  sense  developed  by
neoclassical  economists.
Lobbying  by Interest  Groups
Some  economists  and  political  scientists  have found  the
new political economy to be useful as a way of understandinv
public  policy  in the  United  States  (see  especially  Alt and
Chrystal  1983;  and  Keech,  Bates,  and Lange  1989,  for  reviews).
In  particular,  they  find  its  explanation  of the activities  of
lobby  groups  and elected  officials  to be consistent  with  aspects
of  contemporary  American  politics  such  as  "hyperpluralist"
fragmentation  of  interest  groups,  the  power  of  small,  focused
lobbies  over  the substance  of policy  in  specific  areas,  the
extreme  difficulty  of aggregating  interests,  the sensitivity  of
lawmakers  to the demands  of narrow  c-r'stituencies  and  the re-
election  imperative,  and  the reactive  and incoherent  nature  of
much  public  policy (see  Alt  and Chrystal  1983;  Riker  1982).  14
There  is  much  evidence  in contemporary  politics  in the  United
States  that  public  policy  has,  in fact,  been  parcelled  out  to
organized  interests  and that  the  government  has moved  far from
its  original  role in  protecting  rights  and  enforcing  contracts  to
one  that is  highly  interventionist  and regulatory. In fact,  much
policy  making  in the  United  States  tends  to be an extremely  open24
and highly visible public pulling and hauling among narrowly
focused interest groups, legislatures, and executive offices and
the accumulation of legislation is vast and often contradictory.
Many have referred to the "iron triangle" of lobby groups,
legislators, and executive agencies that results in extensive
allocation of benefits to special interests.  It is clear that
organized interests in the United States are a highly visible
source of power and initiative in public policy making.
This pattern of policy "driven" by societal interests,
of the state as a more or less neutral arena in which competitive
lobbies  fight  for control  of policy  resources,  is much  less  in
evidence in the vast majority of developing countries.  In these
countries, policy making tends to be more closed, less visible,
and more centered in the political executive (see Grindle and
Thomas 1989).  In many countries, citizens often have their first
information about policy when it is formally announced or decreed
by the political leadership.  In general, high level
administrators and political leaders dominate the policy making
process.  It is they, not legislators,  who tend to be the targets
of those who would influence the decision making process.  They
may or may not retain office through elections and their tenure
in office is often highly ambiguous.  Perhaps most important,
extensive organized interest group activity tends to be less
clearly defined in developing countries than in the
industrialized democracies of the West.  Large portions of the
population--peasants and urban shantytown residents, for25
instance--are generally not organized for sustained political
activity, although they may, from time to time, make their
demands known through actions such as protest marches, riots, or
strikes.  Ethnic or family identities may play critical roles in
politics even though they are not publicly organized.
Additionally, many authoritarian regimes in the third world
actively discourage representation of societal interests through
formally constituted interest groups.  "Interests"  clearly exist
in developing countries, of course, but the extent to which they
are or can be formally constituted to represent goals of a
membership, and their capacity to gain access to the state, need
always to be identified empirically.  In many cases, "barriers to
entry" are high and any assumptions about democratic
responsiveness need to be scrutinized carefully.
Lobbying activity is consequently difficult to identify
in  many developing  countries. In some  cases,  elite
organizations--the  ubiquitous  national  chamber  of  manufacturers
or  the national  agricultural  society,  for  instance--may  be well
organized  and  vociferous,  but  wield  their  real  political
influence  behind  the scenes  in informal  interactions  with
political  leaders,  not  through  votes  or more  visible  lobbying
activities. In other  cases,  the  most important  economic
interests  in a society  may not even  be formally  organized. The
power  of some  interests  over  particular  policy  choices  may be
more implicit  than  explicit--few  decision  makers  are  unaware  of
the  concerns  of the  military  or foreign  investors,  for  instance,26
although these "interests"  may not articulate their needs
explicitly or publicly.  In other cases, organizations will lack
access to policy makers or even the capacity to control their
followings or exert pressure on the decision making process.
Sometimes, organized groups may actually be dependent clientele
organizations  of bureaucratic agencies or of particular political
leaders, with little capacity to press a policy agenda on their
patrons in government.  Similarly, political parties in one party
or dominant party states have very little power independent of
government leadership.  In clientelistic states, interest group
activities tend to be highly disaggregated and personalized and
to focus more on influencing implementation activities than
decision making about which policies should be pursued.  Thus,
.the  assumption that policy outcomes represent societal interests
and that policy is made in response to the activities of lobby
groups often seriously misrepresents the dynamics of policy
making in large numbers of developing countries.i 5 In addition,
the political economy analyses that have emerged in the United
States are about political interactions  that occur within the
context of agreed upon rules of the game for political
competition or about how those rules got agreed upon (see  Riker
1982; Barry and Hardin 1982; Buchanan 1980).  In developing
countries, however, it cannot always be assumed that the rules of
the game are established or agreed upon.  Where this is the case,
the use of society-centric  political economy models is
misleading.27
The Actions of Policy Makers
In its more state-centric applications, the new
political economy has sought to provide insight into the behavior
of policy elites.  It asserts that (elected)  political leaders
want to stay in power; they will madimize their chances of
achieving this end by using policy resources to reward supporters
or potential supporters (see Lindbeck 1976; Ames 1987; Bates
1981; Anderson and Hayami 1986; Bennett and DiLorenzo 1984).
According to this view, policy outcomes can be systematically
traced to efforts of policy elites to buy political support and
to establish and maintain supportive coalitions.16 This
perspective corresponds to much that can be observed in
developing countries, where, as we have argued, policy elites are
central to policy making.  Political stability and the
maintenance of power tend to be major preoccupations of these
political actors because, in many cases, they are very vulnerable
to the loss of political power (see  Grindle and Thomas 1989).
Moreover, the regimes they lead are also often vulnerable.  Coups
and leadership changes are regularly noted phenomena that can
have severe personal consequences for political leaders because
they can result in imprisonment,  exile, or even death for those
who held prominent roles in the overthrown government.  For this
reason, it is reasonable to expect that such elites are extremely
sensitive to the need to satisfy certain societal and government
(military,  public servants) interests in repeated bids to
establish or maintain support.  According to Ames'  (1987)28
analysis of budgetary politics in Latin America, for instance,
normal politics is the politics of survival.  "Given the
frequency of military coups, the dismal reelection record of
incumbents, and the volatility of open economies, executives can
rarely take political survival for granted.  To the maximum
deg'-ee  possible, every program must be subjected to the
executive's drive for security" (p. 211).
Nevertheless, the new political economy overemphasizes
the direct link between policy and political support building.
In fact, policy elites may have little direct information on the
interests of particular groups in society or of the limits of
tolerance for policy actions that do not directly benefit, or
that can even harm, these interests.  As noted, policy making
tends to occur in relatively closed circles and the decision
making process may be highly centralized in a few critical
leadership positions.  Similarly, interest articulation
structures (lobby  groups) are often much less visible, dense, or
apparent than is the case with long established Western
democracies.  This is not to argue that policy elites are
unconstrained by societal initerests,  but only that the link
between state and interests is elusive in terms of how societal
policy preferences are made known to decision makers.  Thus,
policy elites are vulnerable to the claims of many interests, but
they may survive politically on the basis of astute intuition
about politically relevant groups rather than through the more
direct knowledge that results from organized interest group29
lobbying.  They know that some of their decisions can have
personally harmful consequences, but they often have little
direct information about the limits of societal tolerance for
policy change.  Support coalition formation or the capacity to
mobilize non-elite groups for political support may be especially
difficult under conditions of very imperfect informati:-n.
Given the problems of interest representation in policy
making in developing countries, there is considerable scope for
the preferences of policy elites to influence the choice of
policy and to define what is acceptable policy (see  Grindle and
Thomas 1989).  Their space to define policy is greater, az is the
potential to make mistaken judgments, given the problem of
information.  In addition, there is extensive evidence that
policy elites are not idea free and that politicians are not
contentless in terms of their preferences.  They generally have
very explicit notions of what constitutes good policy and,
although clearly concerned about staying in power, they are not
undiscriminating in terms of maximizing their capacity to do so.
They have historically and ideologically determined coalition
partners and support groups, as well as clearly defined opponents
whose support they will not seek, even in the interests of
staying in power.  Once this is acknowledged, the idea of power
maximization should become a less central assumption about what
drives policy elites.  Power is less an end than a means to an
end.  17  Moreover, where states have played significant roles in
defining and directing the course of economic development, it is30
reasonable to assume that policy elites will have definite ideas
about "the national interest" or "the public good" that go beyond
individual self-interest.  Similarly, where the role of the state
is large, it is reasonable to expect that policy elites will have
some scope to act on these ideas (see  Bardhan 1987).
In addition, of course, many decisions made by policy
elites are not directly relevant to central issues of staying in
power.  Decentralizing the ministry of health, selling certain
parastatals, raising interest rates marginally, or refocusing
rural school curriculum are decisions of a different magnitude
than a devaluation or an end of subsidies on urban transportation
or basic foodstuffs.  While these latter decisions can bring down
a  regime and/or political leaders, the former are unlikely to
have such consequences and cannot be easily explained through a
strategic "calculus of survival" (see  Ames 1987; Grindle and
Thomas 1989).  Thus, if policy elites play critical roles in
decision making, it makes sense to try to understand how their
preferences are formed and how they are influenced in ways that
go beyond the banality of asserting that they'd like to stay in
office.  Specifying preferences more fully than is done in
current political economy applications would result in a better
capacity to predict the content of policy.
The Activities of Bureaucrats
A second state-centered application of current
political economy analysis focuses on the rent-seeking behavior
of bureaucratic officials.  This has proved a fertile ground for31
neoclassical political economists, particularly in discussions of
trade policy (see Krueger 1974).  Public officials in developing
countries are thought to exchange access to disaggregated public
resources--an import license, for example--in return for some
personal benefit, usually economic in nature.  In trade theory,
this transaction explains the preference for highly disaggregable
protectionist measures, the corrupt behavior of public officials,
and the difficulty of altering inefficient  policy tools.
According to the perspective developed, importers are given
preferential access to scarce goods and bureaucrats not only
enjoy enhanced power, they also can feather their nests.  This is
an important application of the new political economy because it
allows analysts to focus on the extensive nature of resource
distribution that occurs during the implementation of policy in
developing countries.  It also highlights the extent to which
societal interests interact with state officials inside the state
in the normal functioning of government through day-to-day
decisions about resource allocation.
While analysts of policy in the United States have long
pointed to the important role that implementation plays in
developed countries, this process is even more central in
developing countries.  There, because policy making tends to be a
closed and executive-centered activity, large portions of the
population are excluded from influencing  the making of laws,
decrees, and policies that often have direct impact on their
lives.  In contrast, during policy implementation, they may have32
much greater capacity to reach the bureaucrats charged with
pursuing the policy and to bring pressure to bear on these
officials (see  Grindle 1980; Tendler 1982).  Bending the rules,
seeking exceptions to generalized prescriptions, proffering
bribes for special consideration, having a friend in city hall--
these are immensely important aspects of political participation
in developing countries and they often become more important the
more closed the policy making process.  For political economists,
the venality of public officials mirrors the interest of societal
groups or individuals in acquiring access to the resources of the
state.
Nevertheless, the interaction  of individualistic rent-
seeking bureaucrats and individualistic rent-seeking citizens
does not explain the most critical aspects of the politics of
policy implementation in developing countries.  Implementation
activities, for example, tend to be closely tied to regime
maintenance goals.  Political elites and policy makers often
recognize, at least implicitly, the importance of the policy
implementation  process because of the vulnerability of the
regimes or administrations they serve.  Policies may have
implicit goals--provide payoffs to those who can strengthen
regime stability--as  well as explicit goals--achieve the stated
goals of the policy--that become apparent only through the
accommodation, rule bending, and resource allocation that occurs
after policy decisions have been made (see  Grindle 1980).
Similarly, clientelism often serves to hold a tenuous political33
regime together, a regime that must continue to provide specific
benefits through piecemeal resource allocations where it is not
accorded widespread legitimacy (see  Bratton 1980; Sandbrook
1986).  Thus, the slippage that occurs between what is stated as
policy and what is actually implemented--the  slippage that
results from the myriad times rules are bent and particular
understandings are reached--may be more than simply venal.  It
may be a direct result of the need to provide tangible benefits
or immunity from policy to individuals  or groups throughout a
social hierarchy.  "Accommodation of interests," rather than
corruption or rent-seeking, may more fully capture the dynamics
of policy implementation because it draws attention to complex
and intentionil use of the process, not only by bureaucratic
officials, but also by political leaders.  Again, although
neoclassical political economy correctly describes a series of
economically irrational policy outcomes, it is often making
incorrect inferences about how those outcomes were generated.
Frequently misinterpreting the meaning of such interactions, the
approach can easily lose sight of the political consequences that
are more significant than nest-feathering.
If current political economy analyses correctly
describe a series of policy outcomes, is there any reason to be
concerned that the approach makes a series of inappropriate
inferences about the power of organized interest groups and the
motivations of policy elites and bureaucratic officials?  I
believe it does, because understanding the process of how policy34
is made and implemented  makes it possible to assess how and when
policy cha.ges come about and, thus, how policy reforms can be
introduced and sustained.  A better understanding of process, for
example, can provide insights into how problems become policy
issues, what circumstances surround efforts to change policy,
what role policy elites, technocrats, advisors, and others play
in defining alternatives, how choices are determined, and what
factors influence the implementation  and sustainability of new
policy initiatives.  Without such insights, efforts to change bad
policy into better policy is a directionless enterprise.  In the
next section, I consider the problem of getting from here to
there in terms of reforming policy in developing countries.
Getting from Here to There
The new political economy has provided a number of
policy prescriptions for restraining  rent-seeking behavior and
for limiting the extent to which such politically rational
behavior can lead to collectively irrational outcomes.  Analysis
of rent-seeking, for example, has led to comparisons among policy
mechanisms that differ in terms of how susceptible they are to
such behavior.  Thus, Krueger (1974)  is able to recommend tariffs
over licensing as a policy tool because the welfare loss
associated with tariffs is demonstrated to be less than what is35
lost through licensing.  Tariffs are more general policy
instruments and thus less susceptible to rent-seeking by
individuals.  Similarly, extensive evidence of behavior that is
individually rational but socially destructive, such as "the
tragedy of the commons," has been understood through the analytic
tools provided by the neoclassical  political economy and
recommendations have been made about its amelioration (Hardin
1968; Russell and Nicholson 1981).  Alternative policy and
institutional  mechanisms to limit or control the destruction of
common property, such as developing binding rules for its use,
developing institutions of private property, or establishing
conditions under which collective management can be effective
have been suggested (see  Runge 1986; Popkin 1988).
More generally, Kenneth Koford and David Colander
(1984)  have suggested several mechanisms to limit the amount of
rent-seeking that occurs.  Among them are taking actions to
increase the availability of information  about who benefits from
rent-seeking, using moral sanctions to limit its extent,
establishing laws to restrict policies that encourage rent-
seeking, and taxing rent-seeking activities.  At the broadest
level, the central policy prescriptions of the new political
economy support much current development policy advice--
liberalize the economy, privatize some public activities, limit
the scope of state intervention in the economy.  As suggested in
previous pages, according to this perspective, limiting the
extent to which politics can intrude into the workings of the36
economy limits the extent to which state intervention and
regulation can overwhelm the efficiency of economic interactions
(see Bennett and DiLorenzo 1 9 8 4 ).la
These policy prescriptions would be fairly easy to
apply in developing countries if one were to begin with a
political, institutional, and policy tabula rasa.  The problem,
of course, is that such prescriptions are addressed to
governments that have long histories of state intervention in the
economy, that have helped create powerful groups in the society
that benefit from existing policy, and that have become well
acquainted with the use of disaggregated policy tools that can be
parcelled out for political ends.  According to neoclassical
political economy, such situations result from rational behavior
on the part of individuals.  However, while the new political
economy provides tools for understanding bad situations and for
recommending policies that will engender better situations, it
provides no logically apparent means of moving from bad to
better.  For example, as we have seen, it is argued that tariffs
are more economically efficient in rent-seeking societies than
licensing mechanisms for import  controls.  But, if licensing
import controls are widely used in a particular country, and they
are contributing to a variety of individual self-interests, then
there is nothing to explain how or why these politically useful
mechanisms would be traded in for mechanisms that offer
politicians, bureaucrats, and importers less individual utility.
Locked into an ahistorical explanation  of why things are the way37
they are and the notion that existing situations demonstrate an
inevitable rationality, it is hard to envision how changes in
such situations occur except through catastrophic events or the
exogenous introduction  of wise statesmen or technocrats who are
somehow above petty political rationality.  Both such
alternatives have been used, and both are inadequate to explain
policy change.
Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline of Nations
(1982),  presents a tightly argued explanation for the
inevitability of economic decline in countries in which rent-
seeking has become widespread.  Such activities are likely to be
found most pervasively in stable societies, where the number and
diversity of lobbies increase over time and increasingly  make
claims for rents.  Lobbies cause the government to intervene on
behalf of specific interests and eventually constrict the normal
functioning of an economy so much that it is difficult for new
technology to be introduced and for the economy to adapt
effectively to new conditions.  As a result, growth slows and may
even stop, especially in situations in which there are few
incentives for rent-seekers  to join in large organizations such
as unions or broad-based  associations.  Rent-seekers, Olson
argues, will not voluntarily relinquish their hold on policy in
the interest of improving  general economic performance.  They can
only be dislodged when a society experiences some catastrophic
event, such as a revolution, an invasion, or a war.  In the38
absence of such a  shock, little improvement in the nature of
economic policy can be expected.
Robert Bates (1981),  in applying public choice theory
to the African  context, presents an equally disheartening
scenario for the possibilities of change.  At independence, he
argues, African leaders, motivated by the desire to modernize
their societies through industrialization, imposed policies to
extract resources from their overwhelmingly agricultural
societies for use in urbanizing and industrializing.  Relatively
autonomous in their choice of policy at the outset, they soon
become captive to the beneficiaries of the policies they have
introduced and lose their capacity to alter policy.  Urban middle
class bureaucrats, the new industrial class, the urban working
class--sectors in fact created by state policy--increase in
wealth and politica'l  power to the extent that they can demand the
perpetuation and increase of policies to benefit them.  Aware of
the potential for unrest because rural areas are paying the costs
of urban and industrial development, governments buy the loyalty
of rural elites, and their assistance in keeping the rural peace,
through projects and subsidies even while more general policies
continue to discriminate heavily against the sector.  The mass of
disadvantaged farmers, as rational actors with low potential to
acquire political power, respond in economically rational ways to
burdensome public policies--they stop producing for the market
and they withdraw into self-sufficiency,  barter, or black market
activities.  The impact of this behav.or then rebounds in39
national terms--declining  agricultural productivity and foreign
exchange  from agricultural  exports  lead to increasing  efforts  to
squeeze the sector, extensive foreign borrowing, and massive
deficit spending in order to continue to respond to the demands
of increasingly insistent urban-interests.  Politicians, wanting
to remain in power, become locked into a  cycle of increasingly
irrational policy--subsidizing  a few rural interests while
destroying agricultural productivity; rewarding inefficient
industrialists,  workers, and bureaucrats while destroying the
economy.  Ultimately, military coups and other forms of political
upheaval are the only way out of this spiral of increasing
demands and decreasing resources.  In all likelihood, however,
newly installed governments  will quickly degenerate into equally
destructive cycles, to be replaced by other governments, and so
on.
To explain policy changes that reflect increases in
economic wisdom in rent-seeking societies, other scholars have
introduced enlightened technocrats or statespeople  who are
sovehow liberated from the pursuit of self-interest and thus able
to see beyond short term goals to long term public interests.  In
the general context of negative politics predicted by
neoclassical political economists, change is explained
exogenously by benign leadership or disinterested advice.  For
example, at the conclusion of a lucid article on the new
political economy and development  policy, T. N. Srinivasan
introduces benign leadership as a way out of the political trap40
created by extensive rent-seeking.  "Let me conclude," he writes,
"with an encouraging note.  It would appear that leaders in
developing countries are becoming increasingly  aware of the
negative economic and political consequences of rent-seeking
interventions in the economy" (Srinivasan  1985:58).  He goes on
to cite examples of leadership in India, China, and some African
countries where significant public policy reforms have occurred.
However, he offers no explanation for the appearance of these
leaders or their ability to escape the logic that binds ordinary
mortals, unless, of course, the concept of self-interest is
expanded to include  the capacity to conceptualize the long term
public interest as individual utility maximization, in which case
the concept of self-interest becomes er2fatively meaningless.
If cataclysms or benign leaders are necessary for
policy reform to occur, it could be expected that the
introduction of changed policy would occur only sporadically.
Several examples of significant policy changes in the 1980s
suggest, however, that despite the universally agreed upon
difficulty of introducing reform in public policy, such as was
suggested in the introduction to this paper, its incidence has
not, in fact, been as elusive as neoclassical political economy
would suggest.  Consider, for instance, the case of The Gambia.
During an eighteen month period beginning in 1985, policy makers
in that country introduced a series of significant  policy and
institutional changes that affected virtually all aspects of the
economy (see  Ridelet 1988; McPherson 1988).  Macroeconomic41
reforms included a flcat of the national currency, an increase in
interest rates by the Central Bank, and a moratorium on
contracting important debt obligations.  At the sectoral level,
rates for public transportation, water, and electricity were
raised in 1985 and again in 1986.  In agriculture, markets for
domestic and international trade in rice were liberalized,  the
producer price of groundnuts was greatly increased in both years,
and fertilizer marketing was deregulated.  In addition, taxes on
fish exports were abolished and prices for petroleum products
were also raised.  Institutionally,  the governmenit  froze the
wages of the civil service and, through several measures, reduced
the number of government jobs by almost eighteen percent.  It
also initiated a cleanup of the customs agency.  Greater changes
were introduced in 1987 and 1988.  These reforms, even in
conjtlnction  with a series of supportive external conditions,
imposed significant and immediate costs on broad sectors of the
population and on virtually all politically important interests.
Taken together, it is hard to imagine  how such changes could be
explained through the microeconomic reasoning of neoclassical
political economy.
While the case of The Gambia may be unusual for the
number and extent of the changes introduced,  many countiies in
the developing world adopted important, if more limited, sets of
reforms in the 1980s.
Consider the case of Ghana.  In the context of declining economic
growth and considerable political instability, the government42
devalued the currency significantly in 1983, imposed an austerity
budget, reduced price supports and controls on many consumer
products, privatized some state-owned enterprises, and improved
public sector efficiency (see  World Bank 1988:116; Younger 1989).
The introduction of these politically difficult measures was
supported by external financing, increased investment in key
economic sectors, and an increase in public sector salaries.
From the perspective of neoclassical economics, all of these
changes could be viewed as improvements in existing economic
conditions.  Nevertheless, despite "sweeteners" to some groups,
the policy changes had negative short term effects on important
groups and imposed heavy social costs on broad sectors of the
population, changes that politicians motivated primarily by the
desire to maximize their power might wish to avoid at all costs.
Given the initial context, such initiatives would not have been
predicted by neoclassical political economists, nor, once agreed
upon, could they be explained using the political logic of the
approach.  The rent-seeking behavior that explains economically
irrational policy choices cannot readily explain the adoption of
choices that conform to neoclassical notions of enlightened
policy.
Significant structural reforms would certainly not have
been predicted in Mexico, an almost classic case of rent-seeking
lobbies associated with a strategy of import substitution holding
policy captive to its economic interests.  A currency float that
meant massive ongoing devaluations, drastic cut-backs in imports,43
removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, restructuring of public
enterprise, tax reforms, decreases in important consumer
subsidies, as well as many other economic reforms were introduced
over a seven-year period and generally sustained despite a major
drop in real income,  massive unemployment, high rates of
inflation, and a significant threat to the hegemony of the ruling
political party  (see  Carr and Anzald1a Montoya 1986; Maxfield and
Anzaldua Montoya 1987).  The economic and political crises were
real, but they engendered neither further rent-seeking
accommodations nor coups, revolutions, or other cataclysms.
Instead, the crises resulted in ongoing negotiations, a sustained
commitment to implement a changed development strategy, and a
search for a new basis of consensus in society.  All of this
occurred with virtually no payoffs available to the large number
of politically important groups that were affected by the
changes.
The list of examples of countries that have made major
changes in basic development policies is extensive.19
Stabilization and structural adjustment programs have been
sustained in Costa Rica, Bolivia, Thailand, Korea, Ghana, and
Turkey, among other countries (see Lindenberg 1988; World Bank
1988; Younger 1989).  Indonesia has introduced significant trade
and financial market changes (Flatters 1988; Usman and Robinson
1988).  Bolivia has introduced extensive new tax policies, as
have Colombia, India, Jamaica, and Malawi  (see  World Bank 1988).
Bangladesh has introduced and sustained trade and industrial44
policy changes (see  Mallon and Stern 1988).  The case of China
after Mao is well-known.  Some countries, such as Bolivia, Sri
Lanka, and Ghana, have undertaken major initiatives  to target low
income groups most affected by stabilization and structural
adjustment measures, programs and policies introduced even in the
absence of significant political power among such groups (see
Thomas and Chibber 1989).  Social expenditures have been
redirected to low income groups in Mexico, Morocco, Brazil, and
Ivory Coast (see  Thomas and Chibber 1989).  In Mauritius, a
policy aimed at reducing environmental degradation was
instituted, even in the face of opposition from industrial
interests that were causing pollution.  These countries vary
significantly in regime type, histories of political stability,
and nature of vested interests.  Clearly, each of them faced
severe economic conditions and many faced political crises of
various sorts and degrees of magnitude, but neoclassical
political economy offers no insight into the processes through
which change occurred or the ability of governments to select
policies they believed would bring longer term benefits to their
societies.  The explanation of change is a far more challenging
task than the explanation of stasis.
The new political economy recommends itself for its
analytic rigor and parsimony.  Overall, it allows analysts to
understand the pursuit of policies that distort economic
interactions, the systematic leakage of policy resources for
political ends, and the resistance of policy makers and publics45
to altering existing practice because it indicates that existing
practice represents a politically optimal solution to the problem
of staying in power or extracting rents.  These characteristics,
however, make the theory inadequate for explaining what ought to
be of great interest to development specialists, especially those
who proffer advice about development policy--an understanding of
how change occurs.  This gap translates into an inability to
explain how to get from here to there in terms of introducing
alternative policies.  This is a critical weakness of the
theoretical approach and one that presents a challenge to policy
analysts: can alternative  models of politics be conceptualized
that address issues of change, predict the content of change, and
maintain a viable role for those who seek both politically and
economically viable solutions to the major problems facing
developing countries in the decades ahead?
Bases for an Alternative Political Economy
The limitations of the new political economy derive not
from the fact that it is reductionist, as all theory must be, but
that it is reductionist in a way that makes it difficult to
explain change and the content of change or to envision a
constructive role for politics, even though it accepts politics
as an inevitable part of economic systems.  In the context of
developing countries, in which historical and contextual factors
are extremely complex, a model of political economy should46
provide a means of understanding these factors.  One possibility
is to consider an alternative model, less directed at parsimony
and more at capturing critical moments when change occurs, for
such moments reveal essential political dynamics at work in a
society.  Some elements of such a model are sketched out in brief
below.
First, given the centrality of policy elites and the
state to the policy process and economic development, an approach
that encourages understanding what occurs within the state and at
the intersection  of state and society would be appropriate way to
begin the task of explaining policy in developing countries.  For
instance, how do policy elites and policy managers perceive the
issues, stakes, options, and constraints surrounding a particular
policy problem?  In response to such questions, concepts such as
self-interest and power maximization explain little that is
substantively interesting.  In the context of developing
countries, in which policy elites play critical roles in deciding
policy outcomes, a model of political economy should provide a
means of understanding what their preferences are, how they are
formed,  and how interaction among policy elites and between them
and others influences the choices made about the content of
public policy.  A recent study of twelve reformist initiatives,
for example, found that policy elites come into any particular
decision making situation with general policy references formed
by ideological  predispositions, professional expertise and
training, memories of similar policy situations, position and47
power resources, political and institutional  commitments, and
personal attributes and goals (Grindle  and Thomas 1989).
Explaining particular instances of policy change is difficult
without taking these factors into consideration.
In order to understand the preferences of policy elites
in policy reform situations, and in order to sketch out the range
of options available to them, an appropriate  model of political
economy should also be able to address a series of contextual
issues that surround any particular decision making situation.
These general or background factors affect the specific choices
made by policy elites.  The organization of societal interests,
historical and international contexts, the administrative
capacity of government, and the influence of prior and
coterminously pursued policies all shape the preferences of
decision makers and play an important role in explaining
similarities and differences among countries.  These variables
relate to the institutional and historical context within which
decisions are made; choices are not made in a void but are part
of ongoing patterns of conflict and conflict resolution in a
society as well as means through which "optimal" solutions are
molded by what appears to be possible.  Considering these
patterns introduces the very real possibility that states, for
historical and ideological reasons, have interests and
preferences that cannot be reduced to individual self-interest
(see, for example, Bennett and Sharpe 1985; Grindle 1986; Haggard
and Moon 1983).  Thus, for example, the fact that some states48
tend to select statist solutions to public problems while others
consistently favor market solutions or that unmobilized low
income groups are favored in one and ignored in another can only
be convincingly explained by considering broad contextual
factors.
The values of policy elites and an appreciation of the
context within which they make decisions forms a basis for
considering policy making in general.  However, a model of
political economy that can explain change should also explain the
specific outcomes of particular decision making situations.  For
example, the circumstances surrounding the emergence of a
particular issue have been shown to be of critical importance in
explaining how that issue will be treated by decision makers  (see
Grindle and Thomas 1989).  A particularly important distinction
in explaining variable outcomes is whether policy elites perceive
that an issue is somehow tied to a crisis, be it economic,
political, or social, or whether they consider it an issue that
needs to be dealt with on a politics-as-usual basis (see Hampson
1986).  At issue here is the extent to which decision makers
believe they have no choice but to act to avoid a more
threatening situation or, conversely, believe that dealing with a
problem, although important, is not particularly urgent and that
failure to act will not lead to some disaster.  This distinction
is critical because, depending on how the issue is perceived,
different policy makers will be involved, the scope of change
considered appropriate will differ, and the appraisal of the49
political and economic stakes will be distinct.  Thus, in a
context of perceived crisis, policy elites tend to be most
concerned about macropolitical issues such as legitimacy, social
stability, the costs and benefits of alternatives to major
political coalitions in society, and the longevity of the regime
in pow,er. They will perceive that the stakes are very high, but
also that such difficult conditions require significant and
timely response, often a reversal of prior policy.  Major
innovative change could be anticipated in such a situation of
perceived crisis.
In contrast, if a particular issue emerges under
conditions that can be considered politics-as-usual, the dynamics
of decision making will tend to be very different and the change
envisioned will be that of an incremental or marginal adjustment
or series of such adjustments in existing practice; there is
little sense of urgency surrounding the reform and policy elites
will have much more autonomy to take up the issue of change when
the moment seems propitious or to place it on a back burner when
they do not.  Under these politics-as-usual circumstances,
decision makers are likely to be most concerned about the impact
of change on bureaucratic compliance and response and about
micropolitical issues such as clientelism and narrow coalition
building.  Moreover, high level decision makers are likely to be
only peripherally involved in such issues.  In consequence of the
circumstances surrounding agenda setting for particular issues,
therefore, the politics, preferences, and options considered by50
policy elites are likely to be very diffvrcrnt  when a devaluation
is considered than when the issue involves such changes as the
decentralization of the ministry of public works or a
reforestation initiative.  A model that allows for the analysis
of agenda setting circumstances and the specific concerns of
decision makers can therefore go much further in a predictive
sense than a simpler analysis based solely on notions of
individual self-interest.
After decisions to change policy have been made, a
useful model of political economy should also be able to assess
the extent to which those decisions will be successfully pursued
by considering the nature of conflict surrounding efforts to
implement changes (see  Thomas and Grindle 1989).  All actions to
alter existing policies will encounter opposition or resistance,
and the nature of that conflict is important in determing the
course of policy implementation and the resources needed to
sustain such initiatives.  Research by Grindle and Thomas
indicates that the type of conflict surrounding efforts to carry
out policy change is strongly conditioned by the characteristics
of the policies being implemented.  Some policies, for example,
have a short term impact on broad sectors of the population or on
particularly important sectors--the ending of of a consumer
subsidy program, for example, that results in higher prices for
basic staples.  In contrast to these costs, benefits are often
highly concentrated--removal  of pressure on the public budget,
for instance.  This same kind of policy change also tends to have51
an immediate impact in terms of its costs because it entails
little administrative or technical complexity to implement--it
may be almost "self-implementing."  Policy characteristics such
as these add up to publicly visible and immediate change and are
very likely to engender reactions and conflicts that are public
and explicitly political in nature.  Riots, protests, public
debate, and extensive criticism of public leaders, for instance,
tend to be strongly related to policies with such
characteristics.  These public and political responses mean that
the stakes tend to be quite high, not only for the durability of
the reform but also for the reputations and tenure of political
leaders and even for the life of the regime itself.  Policy
elites undertaking such initiatives  will require considerable
political resources of legitimacy, popularity, regime stability,
and/or external threat if policy changes with visible and
immediate costs are to be sustained.
In contrast, many policy changes result in costs that
are concentrated on individuals  or narrow groups, that produce
generalized benefits that may not be immediately  apparent and
that are imposed in highly disaggregated fashion, often over a
considerable period of time--an import tax levied on certain
luxury goods is an example of this kind of policy change.
Generally, carrying out such changes may entail considerable
administrative and technical interaction before they can be
considered accomplished.  The benefits to public policy and
economic welfare will therefore only be visible in the medium or52
long term.  Policy changes with these characteristics tend to
engender conflict that is played out within bureaucratic arenas,
either through the resistance of public officials or the
personalistic claims of clientele groups or some combination of
these.  Reformers need to be concerned about issues of
bureaucratic compliance and responsiveness irn  these situations.
The stakes for policy elites tend to be much lower than for these
kinds of reforms than for those that get carried out in more
public arenas.  Usually, sustainability of the change is called
into question by bureaucratic and clientelistic responses, but
not ti.e iability of the regime in power or its leadership.
Those promoting reform will want to be able to count on resources
that have meaning within bureaucratic contexts--hierarchical
authority, incentive systems, financial resources, technical
control mechanisms, and the like.
These are a complex set of elements to employ in a
model of policy making in developing countries.  They emphasize
developing the capacity to explain the timing, nature, and scope
of policy change and to consider its viability once introduced.
This alternative to neoclassical political economy places
considerable emphasis on the preferences and perceptions of
policy elites and on the possibility of calculation and
miscalculation on their part of the potential risks in
introducing changed policy.  It makes a distinction between
crisis and non-crisis ridden decision making and a dist_nction
between the macropolitical and micropolitical concerns of53
decision makers.  In doing so, it enables analysts to begin to
explain and even to predict the content of reform initiatives.
Importantly, it presents the possibility that policy elites are
strategic managers within complex policy contexts who have a set
of complex preferences and who are seeking politically,
bureaucratically, and economically  viable outcomes.  It also lays
the basis for predictions about success or failure in the
introduction of reform
What is important to an alternative political economy
model, then, is not the pursuit of individual self-interest as if
it existed in a void, but ways to conceptualize the bargains,
pacts, compromises, and efforts that are made on an ongoing basis
in an effort to craft policy that is acceptable to those who have
the greatest stakes in the outcome and to those whc have the
greatest capacity to stymie  and to support the effort.  Rather
than the sum total of individuals  seeking their self-interest,
the view of politics that this alternative presents is one of
efforts at problem solving through negotiation and the use of
political resources in the context of great uncertainty.  The
results of such processes of problem solving can be good, bad, or
indifferent for the economic system, for society, or for
individual sectors of society.  This is an important point, for
it suggests the possibility that there often exists a space in
which policy elites can maneuver to achieve policy choices that
are both politically and economically  wise and that the
institutional and historical context within which policy54
decisions are reached help define a space for negotiation,
problem solving, and conflict resolution.  If this space exists
in a large number of situations, then there would be an important
role for the policy advice that development economists can
provide.  It may well be worthwhile to attempt to model this
space and to use such models to help craft policy advice.
Ultimately, both economists and political scientists
need to abandon notions and models of politics that cast it
necessarily as an obstacle to  .chieving  optimal economic
outcomes.  It is valuable that  neoclassical political economy
has credited politics with a oasis in rational behavior; it is
less positive that it has done so in a way so as to cast
economics at odds with politics.  Development economists might
begin to feel less beleaguered by what they see as the inevitable
hegemony of politically rational behavior over the collective
economic good if they believed more fully in the possibility that
some political values--the compromise of conflicting interests,
the search for more equitable solutions to public problems, the
achievement of social and political stability based on a
reasonable set of rules about how collective problems are best
resolved, the creation of public trust based on a shared sense of
legitimate authority, the search for basic consensus on the
nature of the public interest, the definition of an agreed upon
role for government to perform, the importance of social
stability for economic growth--have value equal to the
achievement of economic efficiency.  An effective model of55
political economy would be one that was fully interactive, not
one that demonstrates how politics systematically eats away at
economic goals.56
NOTES
1.  An earlier version of this chapter was thoughtfully reviewed
and commented upon by Robert Paarlberg, Dwight Perkins, Stephen
Reifenberg, Michael Roemer, and Judith Tendler.  I am extremely
grateful for  their insightful  advice.  In addition,  T.N. Srinivasan
and David Abernethy provided valuable comments on the conference
paper.
2.  I adopt a Weberian notion of the state in this chapter, that
is, an enduring set of executive and administrative organizations
whose  role  it  is  to  control  a  given  territory  and  to  make
authoritative decisions for society (see  Grindle 1986).
3.  In an often-cited article appearing  in 1976, Tony  Killick
discusses the implicit notions of politics held  by development
economists in the past.  "[E]conomists have  adopted a  'rational
actor' model of politics.  This would have us see governments as
composed  of  public-spirited,  knowledgeable,  and  role-oriented
politicians; clear and united in their objectives; choosing those
policies  which  will  achieve  optimal  results  for  the  national
interest;  willing and able to go beyond a short term point of view.
Governments are  stable,  in  largely undifferentiated  societies;
wielding a  centralized concentration of power  and  a  relatively
unquestioned  authority;  generally capable of achieving the results
they desire from a given policy decision.  They are supported by
public administrations  with ready access to a very large volume of
relevant information  which can be processed efficiently" (p.171).
4.  In this  paper, the terms neoclassical  political economy and the
new  political  economy  are  used  interchangeably.  Neoclassical
political.  economy  has  been  developed  by  both  economists  and
political  scientists;  in  this  chapter,  work  on  politics  by
economists  is  stressed.  A  very  broad  literature  exists  on
political economy; this paper deals with only a part of it (see
Keech,  Bates,  and  Lange  1989  for  a  review;  see  also  Alt  and
Chrystal  1983).  Moreover,  even  within  neoclassical  political
economy,  there are important  differences in  approach.  As indicated
in this chapter, a critical difference among them is whether they
approach  issues  from  a  society-centered  or  a  state-centered
perspective.  What unites these models, however, is their basis in
assumptions  about  the  primacy  of  individual  self-interest  in
political behavior.
5.  "Bad" policy, as used here, is meant to reflect notions of
policies  that  neoclassical  economists  coinsider economically
irrational in a general sense.  As used in this paper, a "good"57
policy, from the perspectives of neoclassical economics, is one
that promotes the efficient function of economic markets.
6.  Riker and Ordeshook  (1973), for example, define politics as
"the selection of the preference of some person (or the potential
preference of some person) to be the choice of society" (p.2).
7.  For Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980:ix),  rent-seeking is
the  "resource-wasting  activities  of  individuals  in  seeking
transfers of wealth  through the aegis of the state."  Bhagwati
(1982)  demonstrates  that under some conditions,  rent-seeking  is  not
welfare reducing.  However, the general consensus among economists
is that rent-seeking is inefficient for society.
8.  Larger organizations will emerge, according to Olson, only if
there is some coercive means to force them to join or if there is
some incentive  other than the achievement of collective goals (see
Olson, 1965).
9.  Pluralist theory  is generally traced to the group model  of
government  associated  with  David Truman  (1951).  Its roots  in
democratic  theory  are  found  clearly  in  the  writings  of  James
Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville.  Robert Dahl (1951, 1971) is
perhaps the best  known  exponent of democratic pluralism  in the
United States.
10.  While neo-classical theory is largely silent..  on the issue,
pluralists differ in  terms of  the equity outcomes  of interest  based
political decision making.  Some have argued that virtually all
interests have the capacity to organize and attempt to influence
government and thus, the actions of government are just in the
sense that they represent the outcome  of an  open competitive  market
of ideas (see  Truman 1957; Dahl 1961; Lane 1959).  Others,  however,
have noted the extent to which social  class, education, money, and
access  privilege  certain  groups  and  gain  them  preferential
treatment by government  (see  Lowi 1969; McConnell 1967).  In this
view, government action is  usually  biased in favor of  the interests
of  the  middle  and  upper  classes  and  against  the  poor,  the
disorganized, the unorganized, or the disenfranchised.
11.  Pluralist  scholars  differ  over  the  passivity  of  public
officials  in  the  face  of  interest group  pressures.  In  some
perspectives, public officials almost  mechanistically register  the
aggregation of interests upon them; in most cases, however, they
are  seen to  play  more  active roles,  arbitrating among  groups,
negotiating  compromises,  and  even  pulling  together  winning
coalitions of interests.
12.  Political elites seek to maximize support not only in terms
of votes but also in terms of rewarding groups whose support is
essential when votes are irrelevant or when there is no agreement
that voting will determine the outcome of conflict.  Thus, public
resources  that  flow  to  the  military,  large  industrialists,
important  ethnic or regional  groups, or  religious leaders,  are seen58
as resource transfers by political elites to buy the support of
these  groups  even  in  nondemocratic  settings.  Among  the  most
interesting work in this regard has been the effort to deduce the
political logic of support coalition formation from analyses of
government expenditures (see  Ames 1987).
13.  T.N.  Srinivasan  has  suggested  that  society-centric
explanations focus on the demand  side of politics, while  state
centric approaches reflect supply side dynamics.  The important
point  of  distinction  for political  analysis,  as with  economic
analysis, is the reversal of independent and dependent variables
in  these  two  perspectives.  Demand  side  approaches  (society-
centric) assert that social groups initiate policy  and politicians
respond to pressure.  In supply side perspectives (state-centric)
politicians  initiate policy  and citizens  respond with  support.
(Personal  communication, Aug:ust  1989)
14.  Riker argues that under simple majority rules, there is an
ongoing process of the formation  and dispersion of minimum winning
coalitions  around  specific  issues.  "Each  coalition  gains  by
dispossessing the losers;  the ultimate result is that everyone has
victimized  everyone else,  and  everyone  is probably  worse  off"
(Koford and Colander 1984:212).
15.  For the policy analyst, cataloguing the organized interests
that  are  affected  by  a  particular  policy  reform--a  standard
procedure in much Western policy analysis--may be an unproductive
exercise  unless  there  is concomitant  appreciation of  the  real
capacity  to  exert  influence  and  the  real  impact  of  informal
processes of power in a given country.  Findlay and Wellisz (1984)
distinguish  between  a  society-centric  democratic lobbying  model and
a  more state-centric authoritarian  model in which "the prince" is
driven  to  justify  his  rule  by  maximizing  the  output  of  his
regime...."  Even in democratic systems in developing countries,
however,  a  purely  society-centric  model  may  misrepresent  the
dynamics of policy making and state leadership.
16.  What the new  political economy explains is  not new to students
of politics.  Political scientists studying developing countries
have  long  known  of  and  dissected  the  political  logic  of
clientelism, corruption, and policy choice in ways that did not
expect  economic  rationality but  as  ways  to  achieve  or  ensure
political stability, support, or power.
17.  I am grateful to David Abernethy for this formulation of the
limits of neoclassical analysis.
18.  Many have pointed out that this clear policy advice has not
been adopted historically by some of the most dynamic developers
in the third world.  Korea, for example, is a case of a highly
interventionist state that through a highly centralized decision
making  system, effectively "orchestrated" policy in coordination
with politically insulated  state technocrats and a captive private
business sector (see  Haggard and Moon 1982).59
19.  Many such policy changes are discussed in papers appearing in
Perkins and Roemer (forthcoming).60
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